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Summary 
The problem of the proliferation of aid donors and channels continues to worsen. It undermines the 
value of aid. We contribute to the existing literature by (a) categorising the apparent adverse effects of 
proliferation; (b) producing a reliable and fair indicator of the extent to which the main bilateral donors 
proliferate or concentrate their aid; (c) explaining why some donors proliferate more than others; 
(d) constructing a reliable measure of the extent to which recipients suffer from the problem of 
fragmentation in the sourcing of their aid; and (e) demonstrating that the worst proliferators among the aid 
donors are especially likely to be suppliers of aid to recipients suffering most from fragmentation. There are 
significant implications for aid policy. 
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1  A metaphor 
Some readers may find some of the argument of this paper a little challenging. We have been obliged to 
translate ideas about rich, textured social and institutional interaction into the dry and precise language of 
statistics, and to spend some time explaining and justifying those translations. This is not to everyone’s 
taste. A metaphor from the world of cultivation conveys the essence of our argument, and will hopefully 
encourage those who are not at ease with numbers and statistics to look at it a little more closely. 
Think of the aid-receiving world as a large field. It is full of a wide variety of plants (countries), of 
many different species, at different stages of development, in a variety of soils. Some are in shadow, and 
some are in shade. Some are in sun-traps, and some are exposed to biting winter winds. They need a range 
of inputs to thrive and grow. They are generally short of moisture (money), and this is the one thing that 
the aid-donors can supply. Each aid donor has a hose attached to a water supply. How, given this 
multiplicity of donors with hoses, could we best arrange for our plants to be irrigated?  
We might disagree on the details, but we would all agree on the first step: each hosepipe would be 
expected to concentrate on one distinct area of the field. From there its controller could identify the 
needs of different types of plants, and how these were affected by the local soil and micro-climatic 
variables. She would discover which plants are best irrigated with a fine spay, which need a continuous 
supply to the root zone, which are vulnerable to leaf damage from heavy spray, and where and when 
different types of fertiliser are best added to the water. She would probably begin to modify the hosepipe, 
adding bifurcations and timing controls such that, depending on time and conditions, some plants could 
get drip irrigation while others received a continuous fine spray, and yet others received the personal 
attention of the holder of the hose. If our crops did not thrive, this would be for some reason other than 
deficiencies in the water supply. 
What happens out there in the real world? It is nothing like the scenario painted above. Most aid 
donors like to wield their hosepipe such that they individually supply some water to many if not most of 
the plants in the field, while simultaneously concentrating on the plants they love best. Some donors really 
like to irrigate cotton, while others think the maize needs the most attention. The net result? The 
allocation of water over the field is largely random. At various points, some plants suffer needlessly from 
moisture shortage, and others from flooding. A great deal of water is lost in evaporation even before it 
reaches the ground or a leaf. And no donor invests in sophisticated equipment to fine-tune water delivery 
because any attempt they make in relation to the bean plot will be overwhelmed by the largely-random 
effects of other donors’ virtually waving their hosepipes around in the air. No one bears responsibility for 
how well the bean plot is irrigated. 
We accomplish two sets of statistical tasks in this paper. First, we find reliable and fair estimates of 
the extent to which (a) different bilateral aid donors are guilty of “hose-waving” behaviour and 
(d) different plants (aid recipients) receive their moisture from a wide variety of sources. Second, we 
demonstrate  that these  most  disadvantaged  plants are  especially likely  to receive  water from the worst 
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“hose-wavers”. Not only will the general efficiency of water use be increased if the degree of “hose-
waving” could be reduced, but there would be special, additional benefits to disciplining the worst “hose-
wavers”.  
 
2  The argument 
Contemporary development aid has its historical roots in Marshall Plan assistance from the United States 
to Western Europe after World War 2. Its first and arguably greatest success in the developing world was 
achieved in Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s, where a large American aid programme played a significant 
role in sparking Taiwan’s economic miracle. What interests us about these cases is not so much the fact 
that the aid donor was the United States. More important for present purposes is the fact that there was a 
single donor, whose agents were both interventionist and authoritative in engaging with recipient 
governments over the use of aid (Jacoby 1966). From an institutional perspective, we now live in a very 
different aid world. It is a long time since the US was the dominant source of development aid. Sources 
and channels of aid have proliferated enormously. First, a large number of United Nations and related 
multilateral organisations have emerged, many of them with their own aid programmes, and each under 
some obligation to operate in a wide range of poor countries. Second, more and more OECD countries 
have developed independent bilateral aid programmes. Having such a programme has virtually become a 
badge of a “developed” status. There are currently 27 bilateral donors, including some very recent 
entrants to the category from Eastern Europe. 22 operated continuously during 1999–2001, each one 
benefiting on average 107 recipient countries (Table 2.1). Third, since the 1980s an increasing proportion 
of aid has been channelled through a rapidly growing number of development NGOs, most of them 
dealing with financial flows that are tiny by the standards of official multilateral and bilateral aid agencies. 
Calculating a measure of donor proliferation virtually identical to the one we employ here, Knack and 
Rahman (2003; see also World Bank 2003: 205–7) show that, on a global scale, proliferation has taken 
place almost continuously since 1975. In other words, the number of aid donors has continued to increase 
faster than the amount of aid actually disbursed. 
The immediate consequence of this proliferation of aid donor organisations and channels is a very 
large increase in the transactions costs incurred by agencies of recipient governments in their engagements 
with aid donors. We can illustrate the typical situation with some approximate numbers that we happen to 
have collected recently in relation to Vietnam, a country that, with aid at about 5 per cent of GDP, is a 
fairly representative aid recipient. In 2002, 25 official bilateral donors, 19 official multilateral donors, and 
about 350 international NGOs were operating in Vietnam. They collectively accounted for over 8000 
projects, or about one project per 9000 people.1 To readers familiar with the aid business, there is nothing  
                                                 
1  Figures supplied by the office on the United Nations Development Program in Hanoi. Note that Vietnam 
suffers from what we call recipient fragmentation (i.e. a diversity of sources for a given unit of aid inflow) to a 
significantly lower degree than the typical aid recipient. The median Index of Recipient Fragmentation for all 
aid recipients in 1998–2000 was about 30 (Table 7.1), when the figure for Vietnam was 21. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of the aid-giving patterns of individual bilateral donors  
(Average 1999, 2000 & 2001) 
  Number of 
countries aided 
by the donor 
Total aid 
disbursed (US$ 
million) 
Average aid 
disbursed per 
recipient country 
(US$ million) 
Percentage of 
recipients receiving 
less than 1% of the 
total aid disbursed 
by the donor 
Aid data 
series used: 
All aid 
events 
Signi- 
ficant 
aid 
events  
All aid 
events 
Signif-
icant 
aid 
events 
All aid 
events 
Signi- 
ficant 
aid 
events 
All aid events  
Australia 98 47 607  603  6.2 12.8 82% 
Austria 114 66 346  338  3.0 5.1 82% 
Belgium 104 72 310  305  3.0 4.2 71% 
Canada 130 95 508  500  3.9 5.3 73% 
Denmark 87 62 723  719  8.3 11.6 82% 
Finland 98 51 159  152  1.6 3.0 76% 
France 133 112 2126  2122  16.0 18.9 87% 
Germany 135 110 2332  2330  17.3 21.2 76% 
Greece 71 11 80  75  1.1 6.8 90% 
Ireland 96 37 125  117  1.3 3.1 84% 
Italy 103 73 414  408  4.0 5.6 90% 
Japan 135 128 7905  7902  58.6 61.7 90% 
Luxembourg 77 38 87  78  1.1 2.0 70% 
Netherlands 134 105 1317  1312  9.8 12.5 76% 
New Zealand 97 24 58  48  0.6 2.0 78% 
Norway 116 85 640  634  5.5 7.5 76% 
Portugal 51 9 169  165  3.3 18.3 88% 
Spain 102 69 718  713  7.0 10.3 79% 
Sweden 112 85 697  691  6.2 8.1 75% 
Switzerland 112 84 403  397  3.6 4.7 70% 
UK 121 101 1753  1748  14.5 17.3 83% 
USA 123 109 4467  4465  36.3 41.0 87% 
Average   107  72 1179  1174  9.7 12.9 80% 
 
Source: calculated from data on ‘total net development assistance’ in www.oecd.org/dac/stats  
 
 
striking about these kinds of figures. The data in Table 2.2, relating only to official aid channels, 
summarise the global situation in 2000 from the perspective of aid recipients. The median recipient 
government interacted with 23 official donors. One could supplement such figures with statistics and 
anecdotes about, for example, the number of donor missions visiting aid  recipient countries  in a year,  or 
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the amount of time that senior government figures spend dealing with them.2 There is a long history of 
concern about what we are terming the transactions costs arising from this proliferation of aid sources. 
Other observers have used much less technocratic terms. The title of one of the more fluent statements 
of the problem, published in this journal two decades ago, is quite graphic: ‘Institutional destruction 
resulting from donor and project proliferation in Sub-Saharan African countries’ (Morss 1984). Morss 
summarised his argument thus: 
 
The most important feature distinguishing foreign aid in the 1970s from earlier programmes was the 
proliferation of donors and projects. This donor and project build-up, which continues into the 
1980s, is having a negative impact on the major government institutions of developing nations. 
Instead of working to establish comprehensive and consistent national development objectives and 
policies, government officials are forced to focus on pleasing donors by approving projects that 
mirror the current development “enthusiasm” of each donor. Further, efforts to implement a large 
number of discrete, donor-financed projects, each with its own specific objectives and reporting 
requirements, use up far more time and effort than is appropriate. Project consolidation is needed, 
but this is unlikely to occur on a significant scale because of the competitive nature of donor 
interactions. 
(Morss 1984: 465) 
 
The kinds of adverse effects of aid proliferation that Morss criticised continue to feature in the literature, 
are widely recognised by people with practical experience in managing assistance to heavily-aided 
countries, and have generally been acknowledged and accepted by official donor agencies. As we explain 
below, official aid agencies have taken a number of steps to try to alleviate the problem. They have talked 
extensively about “aid coordination”, SWAps (sector-wide approaches) and budget support, and have 
taken some tentative steps in these directions. However, the obstacles to collective action among 
numerous aid donors are extreme (Section 9), and it is difficult to detect within the donor community a 
strong  sense of urgency  about tackling these problems.3  One  reason for this  relative unconcern may be 
                                                 
2  The World Bank’s recent annual World Development Reports have consistently treated this issue. For example: ‘At 
one point there were 405 donor-funded projects in the Mozambique Ministry of Health alone. In the early 
1990s in Tanzania there were 40 donors and more than 2000 projects. In Ghana during the same period 64 
different government or quasi-government institutions were receiving aid’ (World Bank 2001: 193). ‘Developing 
country borrowers, for example, must produce 8,000 audit reports every year for multilateral development 
banks, with the World Bank accounting for 5,500 such reports. Tanzanian government officials have to prepare 
about 2,000 reports of different kinds and receive more than 1,000 donor delegations each year’ (World Bank 
2003: 207). 
3  In addition, one historical current seems to be working in the opposite direction. Since the 1980s, there has 
been a substantial aggregate re-direction of aid away from many middle income recipients toward the poorest 
countries. This has probably exacerbated the problems that stem from the proliferation of aid sources in the 
very countries that are least able to deal with them.  
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that there is little hard evidence on, or useful analysis of, the problems stemming from aid proliferation.4 
The arguments about these effects, which we summarise in Section 3, are based almost entirely on the 
observations and experiences of people working in the aid business, and are qualitative. The costs of aid 
proliferation appear almost to have become naturalised in the perceptions of most aid professionals: they 
are just a normal part life.  
 
Table 2.2 Distribution of aid recipients according to the number and type of 
official donors, (total development assistance, 2000*) 
 Type of aid donor 
 Bilateral donors 
only 
(n=22) 
Bilateral and 
multilateral donors 
(n=53) 
Number of recipients with 1–9 donors 34 13 
Number of recipients with 10–19 donors 93 27 
Number of recipients with 20–29 donors 22 69 
Number of recipients with 30+ donors 0 40* 
Total number of recipients 149 149 
Average number of donors per recipient 14 26 
Median number of donors per recipient 16 23 
* – the highest figure is 36. 
Source: calculated from data on ‘total development assistance’ in www.oecd.org/dac/stats  
 
The aim of this paper is to help focus more attention on the problems of aid proliferation by beginning to 
fill in some of the analytical gaps. We deal here with the behaviour of bilateral donors in allocating their 
aid among recipient countries. The allocation choices that bilateral donors make are largely voluntary: they 
can, and do, choose to extend their programmes to new countries, to terminate them for existing 
recipients, and to exercise a great deal of discretion in allocating their aid budget within their portfolio of 
recipients. It is allocation patterns stemming from these voluntary decisions that interest us. Multilateral 
donors  face  a very  different situation: most  are more or less  obligated to operate  aid programmes  in a 
                                                 
4  A recent trawl of specialists for convincing, “hard” analysis of the problems as manifested within recipient 
countries largely drew a blank (Nick Manning, personal communication). The most useful published work we 
know, that attempts indirect measures of the transactions intensity of aid in Africa, is by O’Connell and Soludo 
(2001). It is striking that at least three recent attempts to look at the behavioural incentives in the donor-
recipient relationship through the lens of new institutional economics – potentially a very productive approach 
– have in effect become bogged down in very unrealistic scenarios of interactions between single donors and 
recipients, within the general framework of principal-agent models, and have paid no serious attention to the 
behavioural implications of the existence of a multiplicity of (competing) donors (Collier et al. 1997; Martens et 
al. 2002; Ostrom et al. 2002). 
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wide range of poor countries. We do not deal with multilaterals here. Neither do we deal with NGO-
mediated aid. The reason is more pragmatic: the relevant figures are not included in the standard aid data 
set, which is compiled by the OECD Development Assistance Committee.5 
We ask two main questions about the aid allocation choices of the bilaterals. The first is simply: Who 
proliferates? Comparing bilateral donors with one another, which among them are more responsible for 
given amounts of aid being widely distributed among many recipients, rather than concentrated on a few? 
The answer is encapsulated in a simple ranking of donor nations on an Index of Donor Proliferation (see 
Table 5.1). To produce that index we first identified a good measure of proliferation from the donors’ 
perspective, and then checked that it is in no way biased or unfair (Section 5). In Section 6, we explain, to 
the extent that we can, why some donors are especially liberal proliferators. Before trying to answer our 
second main question, we need an analogous measure of aid proliferation from the perspective of aid 
recipients: essentially a measure of the diversity of sources from which a given amount of aid comes. We 
give the label fragmentation to this variant of dispersion, and calculate, for each aid recipient in the world, an 
Index of Recipient Fragmentation (Section 7). Armed with these two indices – an Index of Donor 
Proliferation and an Index of Recipient Fragmentation – we address, in Section 8, our second main 
question: Do the worst proliferators among bilateral aid donors tend to concentrate their assistance on the aid recipients who 
suffer the worst fragmentation problems? The practical importance of this issue should be clear. If the answer 
were “yes”, there would be a strong prima facie case for the international community to attempt to alleviate 
the overall problem of aid proliferation by trying to change in particular the allocation behaviour of these 
heavy proliferators. Getting them to concentrate, rather than proliferate, their aid would have an unusually 
large and positive impact on the recipient countries suffering most from fragmentation. And our statistical 
analysis confirms that the answer is “yes”. Aid recipients that experience the most extreme fragmentation 
in the sourcing of their aid are indeed, in a statistical sense, very likely to be aided by the worst 
proliferators among the donors.  
Before presenting the quantitative analysis, we first sort out in Section 3 some conceptual issues 
about transactions costs, proliferation and aid, and explain in more detail the basis and scope of the 
research reported here. Then in Section 4 we explain how we used the data that were available to us.  
 
                                                 
5  Were these data available, we would face problems of trying to compare the relative transactions costs imposed 
on recipient governments by international NGOs and official bilaterals respectively. Individual NGOs engage 
with recipient governments to a far lower extent than do individual bilaterals, and therefore generate much 
lower transactions costs per institution. But NGOs are much more numerous, and operate much smaller aid 
programmes than bilaterals. It is an open question whether transactions costs per $1 of aid are significantly 
different among the two kinds of channels.  
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3  Transactions costs and the proliferation of aid channels 
Development aid is supposed to help improve national economic performance. There are very strong 
reasons to believe that, all other considerations aside, aid often underperforms because it flows through 
too many institutional channels. This generates high transactions costs within each recipient nation, and 
so reduces the value of aid. What are these transactions costs? No one has ever measured them. It is not 
clear that they are measurable. Indeed, although the concept of “transactions costs” has a prominent role 
in the conceptual armory of contemporary economics, it remains to be demonstrated that transactions 
costs are measurable in anything other than the most unusual circumstances (Toye 1995). However, the 
concept remains very useful, all the more so since it can be used flexibly to suit different contexts and 
problems. Building on existing literature6 and personal experiences in the aid business, we present a list of 
the different kinds of transactions costs that are generated, for recipient governments, by what Morss (above) 
called “donor and project proliferation”, i.e. the multiplication of aid channels. We also make our own 
modest conceptual contribution to the debate by suggesting that these transactions costs usefully can be 
divided into two categories: (a) direct transactions costs, that essentially take the form of the absorption of the 
scarce energies and attentions of relatively senior government staff; and (b) indirect transactions costs, that 
take the form of the dysfunctional bureaucratic and political behaviour that is stimulated by aid 
proliferation.7  
 
3.1 Direct transactions costs of aid proliferation 
(i) Aid is divided into many packets (“projects”), each of them requiring separate negotiation and distinct 
management and reporting requirements. This absorbs the energy and attention of (senior) politicians and 
bureaucrats to an inefficient degree. 
 
(ii) The fact that aid comes from a variety of sources (donors) means that the energies and attentions of 
senior government personnel are absorbed, to an inefficient degree, in establishing and maintaining 
relationships with a multiplicity of donor agencies, and adjusting to their differing procedural 
requirements, languages and forms of expression, policy idioms, financial years, etc.  
 
3.2 Indirect transactions costs of aid proliferation 
(iii) Countries that are aid-dependent tend to be poor, and public servants ill-paid. They can often 
significantly increase – or multiply – their formal salaries by working “for” aid agencies and projects. In 
some cases they leave public service and become employees of local aid offices, thus draining the public 
service of valuable experience and talent. In other cases they work ‘for’ aid agencies in a less direct but 
                                                 
6  Among the many contributions to this subject, we are indebted to: Brautigam (1999); Burnell (2001); Cassen 
and Associates (1986: 219–24); Cohen (1991); Dollar and Pritchett (1998); Knack and Rahman (2003); 
LeComte (1986); Leonard (1987); Morss (1984); O’Connell and Soludo (2001); Wilson (1993); and World Bank 
(2003: Chapter 11).  
7  There is an implicit hypothesis, not central to present concerns, that the higher the degree of aid proliferation, 
the higher the ratio of indirect to direct transactions costs. 
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arguably more pernicious way: by obtaining such significant remuneration (fees, responsibility allowances, 
travelling allowances, meeting allowances, overseas travel) by virtue of being the officers responsible for 
aid project design, management or performance that they face powerful incentives to neglect other duties; 
to protect and extend particular aid projects independently of their merit on public interest grounds; and 
to strive to continue the practice of spending aid money through projects, rather than through broader 
programmes, including SWAps, or budget support.  
 
(iv) Because individual donors like to boost their own projects with technical assistance and training for 
local government staff, the expenditures and efforts on these activities are excessive.8 
 
(v) A diversity of aid channels makes it easier for national-level government officials and politicians to 
protect their vested interests in particular projects by excluding aid projects from – or misrepresenting 
them in – public budgetary processes and fiscal statistics. This renders coherent policy making more 
difficult, and reduces the scope for elected legislatures in particular to have a proper, institutionalised 
influence over fiscal decisions (Burnell 2001). 
 
(vi) Where there are many aid donors, they are frequently in clear, and sometimes very visible, 
competition with one another – for attractive projects, for the time and attention of senior policymakers, 
for the assistance of good public servants, or for influence over the policies of the recipient government. 
This competition can spill over into their relationships with one another, and lead, for example, to the 
“hoarding” of information, and for less than whole-hearted engagement in the processes normally labelled 
“donor coordination”. 
 
(vii) Least tangibly of all, a multiplicity of donors in one recipient country can contribute to a lack of a 
sense of responsibility for the outcomes of aid. The more donors there are, the easier it is to assume or 
assert that the lack of development progress is someone else’s fault; and the greater are the temptations 
for individual donor agencies to focus efforts on obtaining good results from their own projects, even if 
this impinges adversely on overall aid performance.9    
 
                                                 
8  ‘In Malawi training accounts for a staggering $4.5 million, or 10 per cent of donor spending on health care a 
year. It is hard to believe that the return on this investment matches the cost. And the real cost appears to be 
even higher: staff may be absent from work for long periods on training courses. Training opportunities are 
often a form of incentive for staff. In that case, the funds would likely be better used if the sponsoring donors 
provided them directly to supplement salaries through the budget. The $4.5 million spent on training health 
workers in Malawi would translate on average to a 50 per cent increase in salary for all health care staff’ (World 
Bank 2003: 207–8). 
9  Contrast, for example, Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Americans, the sole aid donors, felt a strong 
sense of commitment to a successful outcome (Jacoby 1966). 
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This paper provides no independent additional evidence either on the extent of the transactions costs 
arising from aid proliferation or on their effects on developing countries.10 We believe, on the basis of the 
kinds of evidence summarised above, that these costs have long been unacceptably high in many 
countries. We deal here with the causes: the patterns of bilateral aid allocation that provide an 
environment in which these transactions costs escalate. Aid would be more effective, we believe, if it were 
given to individual countries though fewer channels (Section 9). Further, we do not deal here with all 
types of aid proliferation stemming from the allocation decisions of bilateral donors. From the 
perspective of the aid recipient, donors can be responsible for proliferation of two distinct kinds. The first 
we label source proliferation: the provision of aid to a particular country from a wide variety of donors in 
relatively small amounts. The second, use proliferation, is the division of aid among a wide variety of end 
uses in-country. This latter concern is essentially the old question of how far a given volume of aid is 
divided into small packets (“projects”) or large packets (“programmes”). As we have explained above, 
both types of proliferation are responsible for high transactions costs. We have a comprehensive and 
reliable international data set relating to source proliferation. The data on use proliferation – on the 
fragmentation of a recipient country’s aid inflow among separate projects and programmes – are less 
complete. However, making the best of these incomplete data, Knack and Rahman (2003) have recently 
calculated measures of what we term source proliferation and use proliferation for a large number of recipient 
countries, and find that the two measures are highly correlated.11 We can therefore be confident that, 
while it formally relates only to source proliferation, our Index of Donor Proliferation is a good measure of 
aid proliferation in the broad sense of the term.  
 
4  Definitions and data  
The data we use are available from the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD, 
DAC) in a standardised form as a series of matrices that link donor and recipient 
(www.oecd.org/dac/stats). Unless otherwise stated, all our data refer to net official development assistance, 
averaged over the years 1999, 2000, and 2001.12 Our pool of potential aid recipients was defined as all UN 
member states: i.e. we ignored non-sovereign territories. Our basic unit of analysis is what we term an aid 
event: an entry into  a  cell  in  a  matrix  for  a  particular  year,  indicating  that,  in  that  year,  money  was 
                                                 
10  Because of problems with both data and methods, it is extremely difficult to research either of these issues 
adequately. Knack and Rahman (2003) find a statistical association over time between the degree of donor 
proliferation and declines in bureaucratic quality in heavily-aided countries. For a range of reasons, their results 
can be no more than suggestive.  
11  Their data on the division of national aid inflows into projects and programmes come from the Development 
Gateway data base, AiDa (Accessible Information on Development Activities). 
12  Net official development assistance excludes repayments. One might argue that data on gross aid 
disbursements are better suited to our purpose, as they give a better indication of the number of aid 
transactions between donors and recipients. Unfortunately, the OECD does not provide figures on gross 
official development assistance for the most recent years. We use the best data available. We did however run 
all the statistical analysis reported here for an earlier set of years (1998–2000) for which gross disbursement data 
are available, using both gross and net figures separately. Our conclusions are essentially unchanged. 
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transferred from donor to recipient. There are many technical questions about the definition and 
measurement of aid that we simply by-pass here, because the Development Assistance Committee has 
already made decisions about them in compiling its data series. The Development Assistance Committee 
does however provide us with a number of alternative measures of aid. Two choices that we made require 
explanation: 
 
(i) For self-evident reasons, we chose to use data on aid disbursements (i.e. actual financial transfers) 
rather than commitments (i.e. previous agreements to make transfers). 
 
(ii) There is a choice about whether (a) to count all recorded aid flows as aid events, however small they 
might be, or (b) to exclude some very small transactions. The case for the latter option is that a substantial 
proportion of all aid events take the form of small grants, notably for travel and education scholarships, 
or for in-country events financed directly from the donor’s embassy. It seems likely that these kinds of 
activities typically do not generate the kinds of transactions costs with which we are concerned. If one 
accepts that argument, the question is then how to define what we can generically term an insignificant aid 
event, i.e. one too small to merit attention in quantitative analysis. We decided to make the cut-off point 
US$500,000. Any recorded aid event of US$500,000 or less we defined as insignificant. Note that during 
1999–2001, our 22 bilateral donors were responsible for an annual average of 2349 aid events, and 1573 
significant aid events. In other words, exactly one third of all aid events were insignificant, being valued at 
US$500,000 or less.  
 
We did not ignore insignificant events. We did all our calculations using both alternative measures: (a) all 
aid events; and (b) significant aid events – meaning those of a value of more than US$500,000. None of our 
results were substantively affected by the choice of data set. 
 
5  Identifying proliferators 
Proliferation, in the sense in which we use the term here, refers to the extent to which an aid donor 
disperses its aid budget among a portfolio of potential recipients. In statistical terms, it is equivalent to 
dispersion, and the opposite of concentration (or, inequality). There are two dimensions to our concept and 
measure of proliferation: (a) the proportion of the total number of potential recipients who actually 
receive any share of the aid budget of a particular donor; and (b) the extent to which that total budget is 
shared equally among all those recipients, or concentrated on some, leaving others only with crumbs. 
There is more proliferation (dispersion) when (a) the cake is shared among a larger proportion of the total 
potential number of recipients and (b) each receives a relatively equal share. Take as a hypothetical 
example four donor countries, each with an annual aid budget of $100 million, and all operating in the 
same aid universe in which there are 100 potential recipient countries. Donor A divides its aid budget 
equally among those 100 countries, giving each $1 million. It disperses its aid as widely as possible, and 
therefore receives the highest possible score as a proliferator. Donor B gives $5 million to each of 
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20 countries, and none to the remaining 80 countries. It therefore ranks as less of a proliferator (= more 
of a concentrator) than A. Donor C also aids 20 countries, but gives $13 million each to 4 of them, and $3 
million each to the remaining 16. Donor C is less of a proliferator than B. Finally, by giving all of its $100 
million to one recipient, donor D attains the highest possible score as a concentrator. The measure of 
dispersion we use to compare aid donors is completely independent of the relative size of their aid 
budgets. Conceptually, it is a measure of how widely each donor disperses a budget of $X, where X can 
take any value. 
 
Table 5.1 Ranking of bilateral donors by Index of Donor Proliferation 
 Index of Donor Proliferation: 
 absolute values 
Ranking for bilateral donors by 
the value of their Index of 
Donor Proliferation 
(Highest value listed as 1)  
Aid data series 
used: 
All aid events  Significant aid 
events  
All aid events  Significant aid 
events  
Germany   299     297   1 1 
Canada   256     239   2 2 
Netherlands   220     216   3 3 
Switzerland   217     206   4 4 
Norway   205     198   5 6 
Belgium   200     189   6 7 
United States   200     199   7 5 
Sweden   191     185   8 8 
France   183     181   9 9 
Finland   166     147   10 13 
Japan   162     162   11 10 
Italy   160     154   12 12 
United Kingdom   160     158   13 11 
Luxembourg   160     128   14 17 
New Zealand   150     107   15 18 
Denmark   149     146   16 14 
Spain   148     145   17 15 
Austria   137     129   18 16 
Ireland   120     104   19 20 
Australia   107     105   20 19 
Portugal   73     70   21 21 
Greece   69     62   22 22 
 
Source: calculated from data on ‘total net development assistance’ in 
www.oecd.org/dac/stats  
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There are a number of potential summary statistical measures of aid proliferation-concentration. We 
settled on the Theil Index as the most appropriate and straightforward indicator of concentration.13 Since 
we are looking to measure proliferation rather than concentration, we inverted the Theil Index to produce our 
Index of Donor Proliferation (IDP). We also multiplied this inverted Theil Index by 100 to eliminate 
messy-looking decimal places. Absolute IDP scores for the 22 bilateral donors, calculated from the two 
different aid data series, are shown in the second and third columns of Table 5.1. These two series of 
scores are virtually identical.14 We used them to calculate rankings of donors on the IDP scale. These are 
in the last two columns of Table 5.1. Note that the country rankings are very robust, and barely change 
from one aid data set to another.  
The measures of proliferation in Table 5.1 are technically satisfactory for present purposes. But are 
they also objective? For we are using proliferation in an evaluative sense: countries that appear as relative 
proliferators are implicitly charged with behaving worse than their fellow aid donors. We must be sure 
that this judgement is fair. It would not be fair if, for some combination of geographical or historical 
reasons, a particular donor tended to concentrate on assisting a region comprising a large number of small 
countries, like the Caribbean. For most Caribbean aid recipients are so small that any significant aid donor 
to the region would have to spread its money very widely to avoid flooding particular recipient countries 
                                                 
13  The Theil index has two components. If we define the portion of a donor’s total aid going to recipient i as ix , 
then the first component is  
 .1log)(
1∑= 


= n
i
i
i x
xxH  
 The maximum value H is reached when an equal amount of aid is given to all n countries, each receiving 
n
1
 
with H(x) = log n. The Theil Index is the difference between this maximum value and the actual H(x), after 
some simplification: 
 ∑
=
=−=
n
i
ii nxxxHnT
1
log)(log . 
 The number n in this case is all potential recipients of aid. If there were only one possible recipient then this 
value is 0. The value T also reaches 0 when all potential aid recipients receive an equal amount of assistance. 
Thus the use of Theil Index here takes into account that a country might be aiding only a small number of 
countries out of the list of potential aid recipients. Later in the paper, we use an alternative indicator of 
concentration-dispersion, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, to measure fragmentation (of aid recipients). It is not 
useful in measuring proliferation because of this need for a measure that takes account of “zero observations”, 
i.e. of the number of potential aid recipients to whom a donor gave no aid. Alternatively, we could have 
measured proliferation with the Lorenz Curve, which picks up the cumulative distribution of aid among 
potential recipients. One problem is that the value of the Lorenz Curve is very much shaped by larger 
allocations at the top end of the distribution spectrum. Another is that these distribution curves can cross one 
another, which makes it difficult to use them unambiguously to rank donors by degrees of proliferation. We 
also explored partial summary statistics of the distribution of aid budgets among recipients, such as (a) the 
proportion of the donor budget going to the largest X recipients, where X can be varied; and (b) the proportion 
of recipients who receive more than a tiny share (e.g. 1 per cent, 2 per cent or 3 per cent) of the donor budget. 
There are several problems in using these kinds of measures for our purposes. The most important is that they 
are essentially arbitrary, both conceptually and statistically. Experiments showed that the ranking of donors in 
terms of proliferation could vary very significantly between using, for example, 1 per cent or 2 per cent as cut-
off points.  
14  The Spearman correlation coefficient for these two data series is 0.98. 
  
13 
with excessive amounts of aid. That donor would almost inevitably appear as a proliferator in the 
comparative statistics. By contrast, an aid donor with historical or geographical commitments focused on 
Asia is much more likely to have the choice of spending a large aid budget in a small number of large 
recipient economies, and to appear in the comparative statistics as a (virtuous) concentrator.  
Most bilateral aid donors have geographical or historical commitments that influence the distribution 
of their aid among recipients. The question is whether these commitments are sufficiently strong and 
geographically biased that they lead to a situation in which individual aid donors have portfolios of aid 
recipients that are significantly different from one another in terms of the typical size of those recipients. 
We sought to answer this question in two ways. Both produced “negative” results, indicating that the 
rankings of donors in Table 5.1 in terms of the Index of Donor Proliferation are fair, and therefore 
accurate from a policy as well as a technical perspective. 
We are testing for the existence of patterns of aid allocation shaped by limits to the aid absorption 
capacity of “small” countries. For that purpose, “small” should be defined in terms of Gross National 
Income (GNI) of aid recipients – i.e. the size of the economy – rather than population size alone. Do 
some donors consistently and significantly direct their aid to a portfolio of recipients that includes an 
unusually high proportion of small recipient economies with aid absorption problems? One way to 
answer this question is to look directly at donors’ portfolios see whether or not they differ in terms of the 
size of economies they choose to fund. We used a simple analysis of variance (ANOVA) test to see 
whether the average GNI of countries aided by donor A significantly differed, in a statistical sense, from 
the average GNI of countries aided by donors B . . . Z? The result was negative: these figures were not 
significantly different from one another in a statistical sense.15  
The second test was less direct, but takes into account the potential effect of another factor that 
might obscure an actual connection between individual donors’ portfolios of recipients and their scores as 
proliferators: the total size of the donor’s aid budget. Start from the hypothesis that the number of 
countries that each bilateral donor aids is very likely to be determined to a substantial degree by the total 
size of its aid budget. The more money you have to disburse, the more countries you are likely to give it 
to. One can test that proposition through regression analysis of the determinants of the number of 
countries to which each donor gives aid. Let: 
 
Y = the number of countries that each donor aids; and 
X1 = total size of aid budget.  
 
If, in addition to the impact of total aid budget, the proliferation-concentration behaviour of particular 
donors is significantly affected by the inheritance of a portfolio of unusually large or unusually small 
recipient countries, this should show up in a multivariate regression equation, where: 
                                                 
15  Using our all aid events data series, the ANOVA test generated an F-statistic of 0.54, with p-value of 0.95. In 
other words, there was a 95 per cent probability that donors’ portfolios, in the sense we have defined them 
here, did not differ from one another. 
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X2 = the average GNI of the ‘portfolio’ of countries aided by each donor.  
 
We did the regression analysis twice, using our two aid data sets. The detailed results are in a footnote.16 
In sum: 
 
• While in both data sets the total size of donors’ aid budgets (X1) is positively related to the number 
of countries to which they give aid (Y), this relationship was only statistically significant – at the 1 per 
cent level (p= 0.0156) – in the case of the data relating to significant aid events.17 
• The average GNI of the ‘portfolio’ of countries aided by each donor (X2) was completely unrelated 
to Y in both equations. 
 
We therefore conclude that any “portfolio effect” is not strong enough to be statistically observable, and 
that the Indices of Donor Proliferation in Table 5.1 are reliable indicators of the relative proliferation-
concentration behaviour of the different bilateral aid donors from an evaluative as well as a purely 
statistical perspective.  
 
6  Explaining proliferation patterns 
There is in fact a distinct patterning to these rankings of donors in Table 5.1, which largely conforms to 
our prior expectations. Let us leave aside the United States which is distinct in several ways, above all 
because it is the only aid donor with genuinely global geo-strategic interests – and a total aid budget that is 
no longer commensurate in size with these global commitments. We can loosely divide the other donors 
into two groups: 
 
• The proliferators – seven of the top eight countries in Table 5.1, (excluding the United States): 
Germany, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Belgium, and Sweden. These countries are 
(a) Northern European (except Switzerland, and Canada, which is a traditional member of the 
informal North European group of “like-minded” donors ); (b) have little or no history as direct 
colonial powers (with limited exceptions for Belgium and the Netherlands); and (c) have relatively 
new overseas aid programmes that are generally distinguished by their “progressive” nature, their 
                                                 
16  Data set: significant aid events 
 
)522.0()670.2(
2008.01724.29278.1530 XXY ++−=  
 This equation explains 43 per cent of the variation in the dependent variable. 
  Data set: all aid events 
 
)228.0()318.1(
2013.01208.43616.2428
−
−+−= XXY  
 This equation explains 24 per cent of the variation in the dependent variable. T-statistics are in brackets in both 
cases. 
17  It makes sense that the statistical relationship between Y and X1 should be stronger in the data set relating to 
significant aid events than in the one relating to all aid events. For, as we saw above, two thirds of events in the latter 
series are for amounts of less than $500,000. The extent to which different donors distribute such small packets 
of money varies widely.  
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responsiveness to concerns about poverty, and their relative autonomy from domestic business 
interests (with the partial exception of Belgium). 
• The remainder – a diverse group of countries that have no single feature in common beyond not being 
proliferators, but which are virtually all marked by one (or both) of the two following characteristics: 
(a) clear historical (colonial, cultural) and/or geo-strategic commitments to a particular part (or parts) 
of the developing world (France, Japan, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Spain and Australia); 
and (b) very small aid programmes. The six countries in the fourth column of Table 2.1 with annual 
aid budgets of less than $200 million all fall into this remainder category. Only two of the 14 countries 
in the remainder category – Austria and Italy – fail to share at least one of these two characteristics 
listed above, and neither have a very large aid programme.   
 
Note that there is a subjective element in the boundary we draw between proliferators and the rest. We 
could equally plausibly have drawn it a little lower to include France and Finland as proliferators. Finland 
has all the characteristics of a proliferator: it is North European; has no colonial history; and has a relatively 
progressive aid programme. The French aid programme is more dispersed than, for example, the British 
because it is the only national programme to bear the weight of supporting a particular (challenged) 
language and culture on a global scale. But this kind of discussion about where exactly to draw a line does 
not change the overall implications of the IDP rankings. Allowing for the vagaries of particular cases, this 
distribution of countries along the Index of Donor Proliferation is very consistent with a rather obvious 
interpretation of why some donors in particular have become liberal proliferators. These are generally the 
countries that have the most altruistic and progressive aid programmes. Relatively unconstrained by 
historical, cultural or geo-strategic considerations that might otherwise lead them to concentrate their 
assistance, they have extended their aid programmes widely to the poorer and more “deserving” nations. 
The net result of these good intentions has been a serious exacerbation of aid proliferation, and the 
problems to which it in turn gives rise. 
 
7  Measuring fragmentation 
When talking about the dispersion of aid, we have consistently used the term proliferation to talk about the 
patterns of donor distribution, and fragmentation to refer to the extent of dispersion in the sources of aid 
received by an aid recipient. Conceptually, fragmentation parallels proliferation. It also has two dimensions: 
(a) the number of sources (donors)  from which a recipient obtains aid;  and  (b)  the extent to which each 
donor contributes an equal share.18 Again, the measure of dispersion we use to compare aid recipients is 
                                                 
18  Take as a hypothetical example four recipient countries, each with an annual aid inflow of $100 million. If 
Recipient A obtains its $100 million from contributions of $4 million from each of 25 donors, then it would 
rank as highly fragmented. In practical terms, its government would have to pay a great deal of attention to 
each of 25 donor agencies. If Recipient B receives $10 million from each of 10 donors, then it is less 
fragmented than A. Recipient C, with $18 million from each of its two main donors and $8 million each from 
8 others, is less fragmented than B. And Recipient D, which receives its $100 million from just one donor, is so 
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completely independent of the relative sizes of their total aid receipts. Conceptually, it is a measure of the 
diversity of the sources from which each recipient obtains an aid inflow of $X, where X can take any 
value.  
 
Table 7.1 – The Index of Recipient Fragmentation (IRF) for 
individual aid recipients: some summary figures 
Aid data series used: All aid events  All significant 
aid events  
Highest level of the IRF 113 113 
Lowest level of the IRF  10 10 
Median level of the IRF 31 29 
Average level of the IRF 40 39 
 
Source: calculated from data on ‘total net development assistance’ in 
www.oecd.org/dac/stats  
 
To calculate the Index of Recipient Fragmentation (IRF) we used the most straightforward available 
measure, the Hirschman-Herfindal Index, originally designed to measure the degree of concentration 
among suppliers to a particular market.19 From the lay person’s perspective, this measure is very similar to 
the Theil Index used to calculate the Index of Donor Proliferation. It is also, in its raw form, a measure of 
concentration. We again use the inverse to produce a measure of fragmentation (dispersion), so that a high IRF 
score directly indicates a high degree of fragmentation. We also multiply the raw score – this time by 
100,000 – to eliminate messy decimal places. Using our alternative data series, we estimated two IRFs for 
each of 179 aid recipient countries. The figures have no independent significance: they are simply a tool to 
enable us to compare 179 countries. The individual country scores are not reproduced here. Table 7.1 
demonstrates (a) that there is a wide variation among individual aid recipients in the values of IRF and (b) 
the choice of aid data series makes little difference to the scoring. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
far from fragmented – and so untypical of the real world – that we do not really have a good word to describe 
its situation (integrated?). 
19  The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the 
market – in this case, the share of each aid donor in the total aid inflow of each recipient – and then summing 
the resulting numbers.  
 ∑
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8  Are extreme proliferators especially responsible for fragmentation? 
Our purpose in calculating Indices of Recipient Fragmentation for aid recipients was to permit us to test 
the hypothesis that the most fragmented aid recipients would, to a greater degree than other recipients, be 
receiving assistance from the worst proliferators among aid donors. The practical importance of this 
hypothesis is clear. If it were valid, there would be an especially strong case for trying to reduce the 
fragmentation problem by encouraging the heavy proliferators in the donor community to concentrate 
their aid more. We tested the hypothesis using multivariate regression. This was to enable us to take into 
account the likely effect on Indices of Recipient Fragmentation of recipient country size, or what is 
sometimes known as the “UN factor”. It is widely believed that aid donors have a preference for aiding 
small countries because aid purchases influence, and every country has a vote in the United Nations. It 
has long been known that smaller countries do indeed tend to be aided relatively generously. Multivariate 
regression analysis allows us to take the country size effect into account when explaining differences 
among recipients in IRF scores. Our hypothesis was that aid recipients with high IRF scores would tend 
to be (a) small (as measured by total GNI) and (b) especially likely to receive aid from donors who were 
proliferators. The regression equation is therefore: 
 
Y = IRF values (for aid recipients) 
X1 = GNI of the recipients (for 2000) 
X2 = Average Index of Donor Proliferation for all donors aiding that recipient  
 
Our hypothesis was strongly confirmed. For both data sets, the independent variables X1 and X2 were 
related to Y in the predicted direction with a high level of statistical significance.20 The very high degree of 
fragmentation  experienced  by  some aid recipients  is  directly attributable  to the fact  that  they receive aid 
                                                 
20  The results were as follows (T-statistics in brackets): 
 Data set: significant aid events 
 
)68.10()54.2(
2347.0X100003.0490.8 XY +−=
−
 
 The coefficient on X1 is significant at the 1 per cent level (p = 0.012); and the coefficient on X2 is significant at 
the 0.1 per cent level (p = 0.0001). This equation explains 48 per cent of the variation in the dependent variable. 
  Data set: all aid events 
 
)30.7()92.2(
2344.010004.0179.4 XXY =−−=
−
 
 The coefficients on X1 and X2 are both significant at the 0.1 per cent level (p = 0.004 and 0.0002 respectively). 
The equation explains 30 per cent of the variation in the dependent variable. We checked whether these results 
were not excessively shaped by particular “outlier” cases. We first identified apparent outliers through scatter 
plots, and then, because some appeared to be larger countries (aid recipients), repeated the regression analysis 
excluding recipients with a GNI of more than $500 billion. This did not change the results in any significant 
way. We also repeated the analysis using the log of GNI, rather than straight GNI, as the X1 variable. This too 
left the result unaffected.  
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from aid donors especially guilty of proliferation. If the worst proliferators would mend their ways, with each 
concentrating their aid more on fewer recipients, there would be substantial immediate impacts on the 
recipients suffering the worst fragmentation.  
 
9  Concluding comments 
Before dealing with the policy implications of donor proliferation, we need to make two disclaimers. First, 
we are not so naïve as to believe that all problems of donor proliferation and competition, and of 
recipient fragmentation, can be attributed to the behaviour of aid donors. We have used a simplified 
language that depicts donors as actors and recipients as victims to help readers maintain a grasp on the 
main elements of what could otherwise become a very complex analytical story. Out there in the real 
world, recipient governments also contribute to proliferation-competition-fragmentation, above all 
perhaps by taking few initiatives to overcome these problems. Their motivations seem quite clear: an 
understandable fear that smaller and more coordinated groups of donors would exercise more influence 
over them. Our second disclaimer is that we are not particularly doctrinaire in our attitudes to pluralism, 
competition, and their opposites. Our concern about the excesses of donor proliferation, pluralism, 
competition etc. does not imply that we hanker after some totally monist ideal, with total hierarchy and 
integration, only one aid donor per recipient country, etc. We presume that the normal advantages of 
pluralism and competition – notably innovation, stimulus to improved performance, and robustness of 
systems in the face of failure of one component – apply in the aid business as elsewhere.21 It is a matter of 
finding the right balance.22 Among people with experience in the aid business, it is hard to find many 
defenders of the present pattern of widespread proliferation on any grounds other than realpolitik. 
Looking at the statistics on aid proliferation and fragmentation, some observers might be struck by 
the fact that virtually all donors spread their aid very widely (Table 2.1), and others more impressed by the 
fact that some donors proliferate much more than others (Table 5.1). If serious inroads are to be made 
into the problem of recipient fragmentation, there will have to be a major behaviour change on the part of 
virtually all donors. While donors have been talking about these issues for a long time, progress to date is 
very limited. Some of the figures in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 help us to understand why this is the case: the 
enormous obstacles to coordination and collective action among donors that arise when (a) there are 
many donors present in each recipient country and (b) each donor is assisting a large number of countries, 
and is unlikely to be able to focus organisational attention on many of them. Look again at the last 
column of Table 2.1. In 1999–2001, 80 per cent of aid events involved less than 1 per cent of the donor’s 
total aid budget.  How in these conditions can any aid agency devote much attention to any one recipient? 
                                                 
21  One of us has in the past written on the benefits of competition among aid donors in particular contexts 
(Moore 1992). 
22  We are grateful to Hubert Schmitz for the suggestion that a key indicator of the longer term institutional effect 
of the number of aid donors per aid recipient might be the effect on the capacity of the recipient to initiate 
changes in policy and practice. 
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It is analogous to an individual lawyer trying to deal with a hundred cases in any one week, or a 
management consultant working for dozens of clients at a time. There is just not enough attention to go 
around.   
Aid donor staff know that. Their ideas and initiatives to tackle the problems around aid proliferation 
and fragmentation take a wide variety of forms, go under different names, and may overlap with one 
another. Conceptually, they fall into four main categories: 
 
(i) Coordination: Donors maintain their separate country programmes and separate in-country presence, but 
simply try to work with one another (and the recipient government) in various ways to maximise 
cooperation and synergy and minimise competition and overlap. Methods of coordination may vary a 
great deal, ranging from an occasional general roundtable meeting to an attempt to establish a complex 
system of “partnership groups”, whereby small committees of donors are expected to take the lead in 
particular sectors and activities (Diallo et al. 1991; Cassen and Associates 1986: 224–35). Aid agencies 
almost universally endorse the importance of coordination and claim that they are active participants. 
More cynical aid professionals view “aid coordination” as one of the most tired and deceptive terms in 
the business. 
 
(ii) Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps): The defining feature of SWAps is that a group of donors agree to pool 
their financial support in one area of activity, or sector, within a recipient country. In principle, this is 
accompanied by an agreement among them to coordinate and centralise their interactions with the 
recipient government, to reduce the transactions costs that the government incurs. The development of 
SWAps has been the aspiration of most of the donor community for about the last decade. While there 
has been a great deal of activity around the idea, SWAps remain a minority phenomenon.  
 
(iii) Budget Support: In the 1960s, Britain and France provided budget support to some of their more 
dependent or vulnerable former colonies in Africa. This was at the time derided as neo-colonialism, and 
the practice was largely terminated. It has come back into fashion in recent years, in some donor circles, as 
a potential solution to all the problems we have been addressing in this paper and a number of others as 
well, including the perceived problem of “low ownership” on the part of recipient governments of 
policies advocated by aid donors. Donors cease to fund projects or programmes, but simply increase the 
resources available to the treasury of the recipient government to finance an agreed range of activities. As 
yet, budget support is unusual. 
 
(iv) Sector Specialisation: While individual donors may continue to spread their aid among many countries, 
they each specialise in a small number of sectors, to reduce some of the adverse consequences of their 
“crowd behaviour”. This is a good idea in principle, but the statistics indicate there is little sign of it in 
practice: ‘. . . donors do not specialize very much, either by sector or by country’ (World Bank 2003: 206). 
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These conventional approaches have two things in common. The first is that they do not have a great 
track record. They have either been ineffective – especially much conventional “aid coordination” – or, as 
yet, have not really been widely practiced.23 The second is that they are actually very conservative 
strategies. Proponents start from the acceptance of the fact that there are a large number of aid donors 
operating in a particular country, and seek ways to improve coordination and cooperation among them at 
the individual country level. However, experience suggests that it is actually very difficult to negotiate real 
improvements in coordination and cooperation among a large number of donors. Take for example 
Mozambique, which has been almost a laboratory for the development of SWAps. A recent study of 
attempts to pool (only) support for technical assistance in Mozambique concluded: 
 
The huge costs of implementing certain pooling schemes, particularly SWAps, have probably offset 
actual and even potential returns. The length of time needed to establish a SWAp . . . is often 
underestimated. For . . . [the agricultural sector] . . . it took . . . more than seven years of 
negotiations to reach the implementation phase, as well as an enormous amount of expertise and 
resources on both sides to manage the process. 
(Pavignani and Hauck 2002: 17) 
 
Similarly, Vietnam has been at the forefront of the process of organising donors into “partnership 
groups”. This has actually generated a great deal of conflict among donors. The question of which donor 
agency is to coordinate the (relatively labour-intensive) process of establishing and servicing partnership 
groups raises long-standing differences among different multilateral agencies about the role of overall aid 
coordination. And the decision to limit actual groups to a small number of active donor representatives 
means that some donors find they are excluded from groups that they perceive as central to their 
mandate.24  
The fact that it proves very difficult to negotiate these variants of “improved coordination” should 
not be a surprise. Individual aid agencies in recipient countries each have to pursue their particular 
bureaucratic or national missions, pay attention to their own policy perspectives and objectives, and cope 
with continuous and generally rapid turnover of their own staff and those of other aid donors.25 Add to 
this the problem of large numbers round each national “table”, and, to the theorists of collective action, 
the obstacles to negotiated solutions begin to appear quite formidable. But suppose the aid community 
took a  broader regional  or global approach,  and tried seriously  to reduce the numbers  involved in each 
                                                 
23  In many countries, much remains to be achieved over simpler issues like harmonization of donor procedures. A 
donor group working in Vietnam reported in 2001 that ‘Donors and recipients alike have been well aware of 
the advantages of harmonization, but little progress has been made so far’ (Donor Group 2001). For a more 
optimistic review of progress in this field, with extensive references, see (World Bank 2003: Chapter 11). 
24  This comment on Vietnam is based on the experiences of one of us there in mid-2002. A document produced 
in Hanoi in late 2001 contains a summary of the objectives and reports on the activities of twenty separate 
partnership groups (Vietnam Development Information Center 2001). There were however considerable 
ambiguities in the minds of Hanoi aid agency staff about the status and membership of different groups.  
25  For a concise listing of the obstacles to reforming aid, see World Bank (2003: Chapter 11).  
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case? This would involve encouraging donors to reduce the numbers of countries in which each operates, 
concentrate more on a smaller number of countries, and thus, without changing overall aid levels, change the 
aid environment in ways likely to reduce the major transactions costs summarised in Section 3. There are 
many ways in which the aid community might approach such a mutual consolidation of donor country 
portfolios. All imply considerable negotiation costs, but, as explained above, so do existing, painfully slow 
single-country approaches. A more global approach at least offers some prospect of substantial, broad 
and very beneficial long term changes. A useful first step would be to recognise that the issues we have 
treated in this paper – proliferation and real cooperation between donors – should be central to any 
evaluation of donor performance. 
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